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Retail sales of prescription drugs totaled $154.5 billion in 2001. The National Institute for
Health Care Management estimates annual sales will exceed $400 billion by the year 2010. This
paper analyzes the welfare and distributional eﬀects of two policy families that could be used to
cope with high and rising pharmaceutical costs. We employ a general-equilibrium approach to
contrast the current patented-monopoly system with a) a price ceiling imposed on the pharma-
ceutical sector of the economy; and b) a universal insurance program covering pharmaceutical
purchases. We use a version of the Kelton and Wallace (1995) monopoly production environ-
ment: a two-good general-equilibrium model in which a license is required to produce one of the
goods. Individuals in the model are heterogeneous with respect to preferences, but have iden-
tical production technologies and labor resources. Results indicate potential welfare gains for
both the price-ceiling and universal-insurance policies, with very distinct distributional eﬀects.
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The current pharmaceutical system of patented monopoly attempts to balance the immediate
interests of patients and third-party payers (who want low-cost medicines) with higher prices and
proﬁts for the pharmaceutical companies. This system grants innovative pharmaceutical companies
twenty-year patents that bestow monopoly status on the innovators.1 The proﬁts earned during
the life of the patent encourage the development of new drugs, and of new drug forms, by the ﬁrms.
In fact, the average cost of bringing a new drug to markets is estimated to be over $800 million.2
Without the opportunity to be rewarded for their eﬀorts, drug companies would not undertake the
risks associated with developing new drugs.
However, for several years now, skyrocketing pharmaceutical costs have put the current system
under tremendous pressure. Although the cost of drug innovation has risen substantially over the
last decade (according to DiMasi, et al., 2003, research and development costs have risen annually
at the rate of 7.4 percent above inﬂation), this rising expense alone cannot account for the double-
digit annual pharmaceutical cost increases. The private sector is responding to the rising costs
of pharmaceuticals through the use of drug formularies, the emergence of pharmaceutical-beneﬁt
management companies and the expansion of mail-order pharmacies. In the public sector, state
Medicaid programs are adopting prior authorization programs for more expensive drugs and either
require or encourage substitution of generic drugs in an attempt to slow their soaring expenditures.
Drug acquisition costs for Medicaid are reduced further by rebates given by the pharmaceutical
manufacturers.3 Medicare reform hopes to oﬀer relief to the elderly (who account for a very large
share of prescription-drug use) through prescription-drug insurance coverage.4
1In practice, since patents are generally granted well before a new drug is available to the public, ﬁrms hold
monopoly status during the ﬁrst ten or so years the drug is marketed. They do not receive monopoly beneﬁts over
the full twenty-year patent life.
2DiMasi et al. (2003), in a study initially prepared for the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development,
estimates the average research and development cost of new pharmaceutical products to be $802 million. This
estimate includes the cost of project failures, lengthy trial periods and a variety of other issues.
3See the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2002), Medicaid Outpatient Prescription Drug
Beneﬁts: Findings from a National Survey and Selected Case Study Highlights.
4Section 101 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (commonly known
as the “2003 Medicare Reform Act”) establishes a standard beneﬁt for enrollees in Medicare-funded drug plans, as of
January 2006: a deductible of $250; plan payment of 75 percent of drug costs up to $2,250; no coverage from $2,250 to
$5,100; and catastrophic coverage thereafter with a small co-pay. There is also an annual out-of-pocket limit of $3600.
See the United States Chamber of Commerce (2003), Summary of “Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003” Public Law No. 108-13 (the “Act”).
2There are two types of public policy studies that should be undertaken prior to implementation
of new public policy toward pharmaceuticals. The ﬁrst type looks at and compares the theoretical
welfare, distributional and eﬃciency implications of proposed policies and policy forms. The second
empirically evaluates welfare, distributional and eﬃciency consequences in the context of a partic-
ular institutional framework and determines speciﬁcs such as optimal copayment and deductible
levels.
To be sure, before passage of the 2003 Medicare Reform Act, several detailed economic analyses
of the second type were undertaken. Both an October 2002 Congressional Budget Oﬃce report
(CBO, 2002) and a 2003 Commonwealth Fund report (Collins, Davis and Lambrew, 2003) em-
pirically evaluate welfare, distributional, cost and eﬃciency consequences of various versions of a
Medicare prescription drug beneﬁt. However, these studies were undertaken within the context of
the current Medicare framework in order to extend this framework to cover pharmaceutical pur-
chases by the elderly. Unfortunately, due to the rush to provide some form of coverage as quickly
as possible, the ﬁrst type of economic analysis was not undertaken. Indeed, to our knowledge,
no economic analyses have focused on the optimal form for government policy with respect to
pharmaceutical coverage. Our work goes some way to ﬁlling this gap.
In this paper, by means of general-equilibrium analysis, we compare the welfare and distri-
butional eﬀects of two alternative policy families often proposed for coping with high and rising
expenditures on pharmaceuticals: price ceilings (as a means of cost containment) and universal
prescription drug insurance (as a means of protecting high-need users).5 We explore these policies
in the context of a monopolistic market structure; we do not consider alternative market structures,
such as perfect competition, that could lead to considerably less innovative drug development. Al-
though variants of both policies can enhance social welfare relative to the current system, they lead
to distinct distributional eﬀects. Our goal is to be able to oﬀer general policy guidance with respect
to pharmaceutical prices and costs by evaluating and comparing public policy families.
High and Rising Pharmaceutical Expenditures
In the United States, health-care-related expenditures have reached an historical high, both in
an absolute sense and as a share of gross domestic product. The aging of the U.S. population
5We believe the goal of public policy should be to make pharmaceuticals accessible to those who need them most.
Thus by “coping” with high pharmaceutical costs we mean making pharmaceuticals aﬀordable for consumers. Policies
that achieve this goal may or may not reduce overall public spending on pharmaceuticals and may or may not aﬀect
proﬁts received by pharmaceutical producers.
3implies this problem will remain at least as severe or, more likely, increase in urgency in the future.
Prescription drugs constitute an important component of health care. Retail sales of prescription
drugs totaled $154.5 billion in 2001; the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimate
that, by the year 2010, the nation will spend $404.5 billion annually for this purpose. Medicaid
spending on prescription drugs tripled during the 1990s from $4.8 billion in 1990 to $17 billion in
1999.6 Furthermore, according to estimates by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce, the new Medicare
prescription drug coverage is estimated to cost $400 billion over a ten-year period.7
According to a recent report prepared by the National Institute for Health Care Management,
the explanations for the rising trend in drug expenditures include declining buyer price sensitivity
due to better insurance coverage for drugs; an increase in the number of prescription medicines
available, especially for chronic conditions; an increase in the diagnosis of diseases in an aging
population; and more aggressive marketing of prescription drugs to doctors and patients.8 These
four factors underlie both an increase in the number of prescriptions written (an increase in drug
utilization) and an increase in the average price per prescription. According to statistics available
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, wholesale prices of prescription pharmaceuticals have risen
over 250 percent since 1982 (in comparison to the producer price index for all commodities, which
rose 40 percent over the same time period).
Accompanying the rising prices is a general rise in quality. Using the Medical Expenditure
and Panel Survey data, Lichtenberg (2000) showed that the replacement of older drugs by newer,
more expensive drugs was the single most important reason for the increase in the average level of
pharmaceutical prices. In addition, he found that the higher price reﬂects higher quality; that is,
the newer, more expensive drugs not only reduce mortality and morbidity rates due to illness, but
also reduce the total medical cost of treating the condition.9
6See The National Institute for Health Care Management (May 2002), Prescription Drug Expenditures in 2001:
Another Year of Escalating Costs.
7See, for example, CBO Testimony: Estimating the Cost of the Medicare Modernization Act, March 24, 2004.
8The National Institute for Health Care Management (May 2002), Prescription Drug Expenditures in 2001: An-
other Year of Escalating Costs.
9We leave to others (for example, see Zweifel, 1990), the ethical issues surrounding the value of extending life or
improving the quality of life, especially for the elderly. We do point out here that a signiﬁcant amount of resources
is being devoted to drug purchases. According to Drug Topics, a bi-weekly publication for pharmacists, forty-two
drugs had retail sales in 2004 alone that topped the estimated $802 million in drug development cost. The top ﬁve
sellers were LipitorR   at $6.0 billion, PrevacidR   at $3.2 billion, ZocorR   at $3.2 billion, NexiumR   at $3.0 billion, and
ZoloftR   at $2.6 billion.
4Prescription-Drug Markets
Pharmaceutical markets are dynamic. New drugs constantly replace older, less eﬀective medicines.
Whole new categories of medicines develop around “blockbusters.” Anti-ulcer gastric medications
provide an interesting case in point. This market, which did not exist prior to 1977 when Tagamet R  
was introduced by SmithKline, is now on its third generation of drugs capable of ﬁghting ulcers,
with each generation more expensive than the one before. All three generations (histamine H2-
receptor antagonists, coating agents and proton pump inhibitors) are now available simultaneously.
Approximately ten diﬀerent generic compounds loosely compete with each other in this market.
Despite the existence of various types of medication for the same condition, evidence strongly
suggests that entry of new branded medications has essentially no eﬀect on the average wholesale
price (AWP) of other branded medications in the same therapeutic class and rather little eﬀect on
their transaction prices (see Dusing, et al., 2005). In fact, the upward trend in AWP for each of the
proton pump inhibitors continues unabated after entry of new medications (see Guo, et al., 2004).
The standard prediction of microeconomic models – that price falls with the number of competitors
– clearly fails in the case of branded medications. Indeed, due to the unique characteristics of
each medication no one of the branded medications is a perfect substitute for any other. Some
patients beneﬁt more from some drugs while others beneﬁt more from other drugs. In addition,
physicians tend to have their preferred medications. Although pharmacy beneﬁt managers and
health maintenance organizations maintain formularies and may encourage the use of less expensive
drugs, each patented, branded medication maintains considerable monopoly power.10 We model
the prescription drug sector of the economy as a monopoly. Each patented branded drug has a
monopoly, over the life of its patent, in the market for that speciﬁc generic compound.11
10Although our model does not incorporate varying degrees of buyer strength (an omission which should not aﬀect
our welfare results qualitatively), we recognize the ability of large hospitals and other classes of buyers to obtain
discounts from AWP. Signiﬁcant buyer power that is used to negotiate price discounts comes from the ability to take
advantage of any between-brand competition in a therapeutic class (see Dusing, et al., 2005). For some blockbuster
drugs, little if any discounting occurs for any buyer – all buyers essentially pay full price. At the other extreme,
Dusing, et al. ﬁnds that one large hospital buyer was able to obtain 65 percent discounts on some of the older anti-
infective medications that it purchased. On average, drugs were discounted for this same hospital buyer 46 percent
relative to AWP.
11We examine gross monopoly proﬁts, rather than proﬁts net of research and development and other ﬁxed costs
of production. Modeling the R & D process itself is beyond the scope of this paper. Our analysis assumes the
pharmaceutical ﬁrm has already completed its R & D and has made the decision to market a particular pharmaceutical
product. Also outside our model are the potential eﬀects of public policy on future innovation. Finkelstein (2003) and
Acemoglu and Linn (2003) show that the pace of innovation in a drug market is related to market size. To the extent
the policies discussed in this paper aﬀect market size and drug-company proﬁtability, future drug development may
be aﬀected. Universal pharmaceutical insurance, by increasing revenues and proﬁts for pharmaceutical companies,
5Once patent expiration occurs, our model (along with the concern over the extraordinary cost of
the drug) is no longer appropriate. Upon expiration of a branded drug’s patents, generic companies
provide direct competition to the branded drug company, seriously challenging its market power
and bringing down costs for that chemical compound.
A General-Equilibrium Approach
Since our interest is in social welfare and general policy evaluation, we are reluctant to rely on
partial-equilibrium analysis. We adopt instead the general-equilibrium monopoly model of Kelton
and Wallace (1995). The general-equilibrium model is superior in its accounting for interactions be-
tween the monopolistic and nonmonopolistic sectors. In addition, the preferences of all individuals
(whether monopoly shareholders or not) are explicitly modeled.
To our knowledge there exist only two other general-equilibrium analyses of public policy toward
health care.12 Bednarek and Pecchenino (2002) uses an overlapping-generations model to assess
the general welfare and distributional eﬀects of Medicare and Medicaid. Their model incorporates
two types of consumers and two possible types of illness. Canton and Westerhout (1999) develop
a general-equilibrium model for the Dutch pharmaceutical market, as part of a larger project to
model the entire Dutch health care sector. The behavior of, and interactions between, patients (and
physicians acting as “perfect agents” for the patients), pharmacists, drug producers and parallel
importers are explicitly modeled. Our model, as described below, shares some of the characteristics
of the Canton and Westerhout framework. For example, heterogeneous consumers in both models
have diﬀerent needs for pharmaceutical products. On the other hand, we treat competition quite
diﬀerently. Whereas Canton and Westerhout model a Stackleberg relationship between a price-
leader branded pharmaceutical manufacturer and a follower generic or “me-too” pharmaceutical
company, our model focuses speciﬁcally on the monopolistic character of patented branded drugs.
Furthermore, whereas pharmacists play a key role in the Canton and Westerhout model, they do
not in our model. With their drug costs largely determined by pharmaceutical companies (with
some room for negotiation for the large drugstore chains), and their revenues determined by third-
party payers, pharmacists have little independent role in price determination. In the large hospital
would likely have a positive impact on drug innovation while a price ceiling, by decreasing revenues and proﬁts for
pharmaceutical companies, would likely have a negative impact on drug innovation.
12There is a long empirical literature dating from Harberger (1954), and followed by Cowling and Mueller (1978)
and Littlechild (1981), that seeks to provide an estimate of aggregate deadweight loss (DWL) to the economy resulting
from a market’s being organized monopolistically as opposed to competitively. See Waldman and Jensen (2001) for
a textbook treatment of DWL and other social-welfare costs of monopoly.
6sector, in any case, drug purchasers either deal directly with the pharmaceutical manufacturers or
work through a group purchasing organization in drug acquisition (see Dusing, et al., 2005).
In the next section we describe a general-equilibrium model of monopoly. We commit ourselves
to a particular utility function for the economy’s agents in order to ensure tractability. Given a set
of values for the model’s parameters (obtained by calibration), we numerically compute monopoly
price, sales, proﬁts and output. Sections 3 and 4, respectively, describe a price ceiling and a
universal drug insurance policy and their equilibria. Section 5 evaluates the policies, comparing
them to the current system of patented monopoly. This section also identiﬁes political economy
issues that could arise when trying to implement these policies. Section 6 concludes.
2. A Patented Drug Monopoly
The model is a two-good, general-equilibrium model in a production environment.13 We think of
good one as a patented, branded pharmaceutical, while good two is “other goods.”14 We summarize
the model in this section. For a more detailed discussion of the model, including comparative statics
and a sensitivity analysis, see Kelton and Rebelein (2005).
The Environment
There is a continuum of individuals. Each individual h has equivalent mass and is distinguished by
his or her utility parameter ρh. All individuals have the same amount of labor resource l.L e tl1h
and l2h be the amounts of labor h devotes to production of good one and good two, respectively,
and let a1 and a2 be the respective technological coeﬃcients for good-one and good-two production.
The coeﬃcient ai is the rate, measured in units of good i per unit of labor, at which h can produce
good i. Hence, individual h produces an amount of good one equal to a1l1h and an amount of
good two equal to a2l2h. Useful later will be the fact that the marginal cost of producing good one,
measured in terms of foregone good-two production, equals a2/a1.
13The model builds on the framework developed by Kelton and Wallace (1995).
14Both goods are assumed to be divisible. Although this assumption is not strictly met for some administration
forms of pharmaceuticals, namely capsules and tablets, it is certainly realistic for intravenous, inhaled and topical
medications.
7Each consumer has preferences over the two goods, with (c1h,c 2h) denoting individual h’s (good
one, good two) consumption pair. The utility for individual h is
uh(c1h,c 2h)=( c1h + σ)ρh(c2h)(1−ρh), (1)
where ρh ∈ (0,1) varies uniformly across the consumers and σ is an additional preference parameter.
This utility function, suggested by Xiangkang Yin (2001a), is a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas
function. One of the features of (1) is that a consumer will choose not to purchase good one when
its price exceeds the individual’s “reservation price” for the good. This feature is important when
analyzing monopoly markets because it allows consumers not to purchase the monopolistically
provided good. In fact, analyses of monopoly markets that use a Cobb-Douglas utility function
are ﬂawed because consumers will always purchase some of the monopolistically provided good
regardless of its price. Note that uh(·,·)s a t i s ﬁ e suh1 > 0a n duh2 > 0, and the matrix of second
derivatives is negative semi-deﬁnite.
We can think of σ as indicating the consumer’s beneﬁt from good one; the lower σ is, the
more the individual beneﬁts from consuming good one. This is in contrast to ρh, which indicates
the need a consumer h experiences for good one. To simplify the analysis, we choose to ﬁx σ for
all consumers. For example, in considering allergy medications, each dose may provide a similar
beneﬁt to each individual (same σ) in terms of reducing sinus congestion and other symptoms.
However, the incidence and severity of these symptoms vary across the population (diﬀerent ρhs).
Some individuals do not need these medications at all; others desire small amounts of them, and
yet others need larger quantities of them to achieve complete symptom relief.
Monopoly Equilibrium
A license is required to produce good one. A group of individuals, each denoted m for monopolist,
share such a license. We assume they take on contiguous values of ρm ∈ (0,c], where c<1. Thus,
c is the fraction of the population that owns shares in the monopoly, and shares equally any proﬁt
generated from the production and sale of the patented, branded pharmaceutical. Monopolists
may use their own labor to produce good one and may hire any or all of the other individuals to
produce good one, paying a wage rate w in units of good two per unit of labor. We assume the
labor market is competitive, so that w = a2 in equilibrium. The monopolists own all units of good
one that are produced.15 They may sell good one to nonmonopolists at price P (measured in units
of good two per unit of good one). A monopolist’s utility is given by (1) for h = m.
15Monopolists diﬀer from nonmonopolists in two essential ways. First, each monopolist shares the license to produce
good one and receives an equal share of any proﬁts earned by the monopoly. Second, the fact that monopolists own
8The other individuals (the nonmonopolists) behave competitively given the price P and the wage
rate w. They choose consumption amounts and a labor allocation, dividing their labor between
working for the monopolists to produce good one and producing good two on their own. In the
continuum of consumers, they have ρh values that span the interval (c,1).
With three preference assumptions, it can be shown that a monopoly equilibrium (consisting
of an equilibrium consumption, production and labor allocation; a price; and a wage) exists and is
unique.16
Nonmonopolist Demand
Nonmonopolist h’s demand for the drug is found through h’s utility maximization subject to his or
her budget constraint (total consumption value equals income: Pc1h +c2h = a2l). We deﬁne ρ∗(P)
to be the cutoﬀ value of ρh for positive demand for good one at price P. Demand for good one is
zero for individuals with ρh ≤ ρ∗(P) and positive for individuals with ρh >ρ ∗(P). The individual
demands for good one and good two, as functions of the monopoly price P, are given by equations
(2) and (3), respectively:
d1h(P)=

ρh(a2l + Pσ)/P − σ for ρh >ρ ∗(P)





(1 − ρh)(a2l + Pσ)f o r ρh >ρ ∗(P)
a2l for ρh ≤ ρ∗(P).
(3)





the units of good one they produce means they eﬀectively are able to purchase good one at the marginal production
cost. While they do not actually purchase the product, they incur either the direct cost of paying wages for good one
production or, if they choose to produce good one themselves, the implicit cost of foregone units of good two. See
Yin (2001b) for a model of shareholder price discounts, in which ﬁrm owners can purchase products at below-market
prices. Since real-world owners of companies are generally unable to purchase products at cost, we chose to assign
the monopolists the lowest values of ρm, where they are least likely to want to purchase good one. The assumption
that monopolists can acquire good one at cost ensures that assigning them the lowest values of ρ will have no eﬀect
on the equivalent variation welfare analysis that follows.
16See Kelton and Wallace (1995). The ﬁrst two of these assumptions are as follows. (1) There must exist a price,
say PH, above which there is no nonmonopolist demand for good one. (2) The total revenue function is strictly
concave. A third assumption ensures that some trade will occur between the monopolists and nonmonopolists. As a
group, the monopolists will choose positive amounts of both goods in equilibrium, as will the nonmonopolists. The
equilibrium is unique in the sense of a unique price and unique sales of good one. We have nonsigniﬁcant multiplicity
of equilibrium labor and output pairs.
9Let D1(P) be aggregate nonmonopolist demand for good one at price P. We ﬁnd D1(P)b y
integrating over those individuals with positive individual demands (those whose utility parameter
















Monopoly Sales, Price, and Proﬁt
A monopolist m also maximizes his or her individual utility ((1) for h = m) subject to the budget
constraint (a2/a1)c1m + c2m = a2l +( π∗/c). That is, consumption value, with good one valued
at marginal cost, cannot exceed monopolist income, which includes m’s share of the proﬁts from
the sale of good one. To compute total monopoly proﬁts, π∗, we ﬁrst need to compute monopoly
sales, q∗
1M, and the equilibrium price charged by the monopoly, P∗
M. These results are obtained by
using equation (6) to determine marginal revenue and setting this equal to marginal cost, where
MC = a2/a1. The approach is as follows:
Letting D−1
1 (q) be the price at which nonmonopolists demand in total the quantity q of good one,


















1 (q) is the total revenue from selling q units of good one.
Deﬁning MR(q)t ob e∂TR
∂q ,w eg e t
MR(q)=a2l








17To simplify the analysis we consider only the case of ρ
∗(P) ≥ c. This assumption has no qualitative eﬀects on
our results.
10Setting MR(q)=MC(q), where MC(q)=a2/a1, and solving for the optimal sales of the monopoly,
q∗
1M,g i v e s
q∗
1M = −σ +
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It can be shown that the monopoly price exceeds the competitive equilibrium price (a2/a1) for all
parameter values.18







This proﬁt is divided equally among the owners of the monopoly.
Monopoly Output and Employment
Whereas q∗
1M is the monopolists’ proﬁt-maximizing sales, total equilibrium production of good one,
Q∗
1,i sq∗
1M plus the monopolists’ consumption of good one. In other words, production satisﬁes
total demand for good one by both nonmonopolists and monopolist license holders. Subtracting
the monopolists’ own production of good one (good one produced with their own labor), enough
nonmonopolist labor is hired to produce the remainder of Q∗
1.
Monopolist Consumption







a2c + σ) − σ for ρm >ρ ∗
m
0f o r ρm ≤ ρ∗
m
18In pharmaceutical markets, the markup over marginal cost, P
∗
M −(a2/a1), can be quite substantial. For example,
when AZT, an antiretroviral medication, was ﬁrst marketed by Burroughs Wellcome (now part of GlaxoSmithKline)
in 1987, the drug was sold to wholesalers at a price of $188 per hundred 100-mg capsules. It was estimated that the
marginal cost of producing a single capsule was between 30 and 50 cents, implying a markup over cost of at least 276





(1 − ρm)(a2l + π∗
c + a2σ
a1 )f o r ρm >ρ ∗
m
a2l + π∗/c for ρm ≤ ρ∗
m,
where ρ∗
m is the cutoﬀ ρm value for positive demand for good one. Monopolists whose ρm value
exceeds ρ∗






a2σ + a1a2l + a1(π∗/c)
. (10)
Social Welfare Under Monopoly
Aggregate utility under monopoly is computed separately for nonmonopolists and monopolists.
First, for nonmonopolists, combining equations (1), (2) and (3) gives nonmonopolist h’s utility as
a function of price:
uh(d1h(P),d 2h(P)) =

[ρh(a2l + Pσ)/P]ρh[(1 − ρh)(a2l + Pσ)](1−ρh) for ρh >ρ ∗(P)
σρh(a2l)(1−ρh) for ρh ≤ ρ∗(P),
where ρ∗(P) is as previously deﬁned. We calculate aggregate utility for nonmonopolists, WM1,
by integrating over all such individuals in the economy, remembering that nonmonopolists with







dρ +( a2l + Pσ)
 1
max(ρ∗(P),c)
P−ρρρ(1 − ρ)(1−ρ)dρ. (11)
The ﬁrst integral gives the utility of nonmonopolists who do not consume good one, and the second
gives the utility of those who do.19









m (1 − ρm)(1−ρm)(a2
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ρm for ρm ≤ ρ∗
m.
Monopolists whose utility parameter exceeds ρ∗
m consume a positive amount of good one,
whereas those for whom ρm ≤ ρ∗
m consume none. The monopolists’ aggregate utility is











19Solving the ﬁrst of these integrals is straightforward. The lack of an analytical solution to the second integral
forces us to resort to numerical techniques in the welfare analysis that follows. A similar problem exists for the second
















Social welfare under monopoly, WM, is the sum of equations (11) and (12), i.e., WM = WM1+WM2.
We also compute a measure of equivalent variation in income for each individual as an alternative
approach to deriving social welfare. Using the utility an individual receives in the unrestricted
monopoly regime as a benchmark, we compute the percentage change in income required for the
individual to attain the same utility as he or she would obtain under the diﬀerent policy proposals.
Let yh represent individual h’s income in the unregulated monopoly regime, and let vh(yh)b et h e
utility h obtains with that income.20 Then, let vUI,h be the utility individual h obtains under
the universal insurance regime (for example). By computing a value for γh in equation (13) for
each individual h, we determine how much better or worse oﬀ each individual is as a result of the
universal insurance program:
vh(yh(1 + γh)) = vUI,h. (13)
The average of all individual equivalent variation values will be our aggregate measure of the
beneﬁt of adopting a universal insurance program. We compute a similar measure for the price
ceiling regime.
3. A Price Ceiling
Although there currently is no explicit price cap on pharmaceuticals sold in the United States, both
public and private payers have methods of cost containment that are meant either to bring down
a drug’s price or to reduce its utilization. All state Medicaid programs include a pharmaceutical
beneﬁt and have some cost-containment measures in place. Since the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1990, states may participate in the federal drug rebate program, in which pharmaceutical
companies give rebates to Medicaid for using their drug. States are allowed to exclude certain
drugs, such as cosmetic, hair-loss, weight-control and fertility drugs, from coverage. They may also
adopt prior-authorization requirements to limit the use of more expensive drugs in a therapeutic
class. All states require or encourage the use of generic drugs when possible, though a recent study
by Fischer and Avorn (2003) concludes there is the potential for an additional $450 million in
annual savings from greater use of generics across state Medicaid programs.
20For nonmonopolists, yh = a2l, while, for monopolists, yh = a2l +( π
∗/c).
13Private-sector managed-care organizations and pharmaceutical-beneﬁt management companies
have an interest in keeping pharmaceutical costs down, although cost containment is not their only
mission.21 Their ability to use a formulary allows them to exclude the most expensive drugs in a
therapeutic class. The prescription drug plans under the 2003 Medicare Reform Act will also be
allowed to have a formulary in which inclusion of all drugs in a therapeutic class is not required.
We approximate price-reducing cost-containment strategies with a simple price ceiling on pre-
scription drugs.22 Of course the model is also directly relevant to any explicit form of price control,
as exists today in most countries besides the United States. To be eﬀective the price ceiling must
be below the monopoly price, P∗
M. It must be above the marginal cost of production (a2/a1)i n
order for the monopoly to be viable. Let ¯ P denote the ceiling price.
¯ P is the monopoly’s marginal revenue. Since MR > MC for all q, the monopoly produces as
much output as nonmonopolists are willing to purchase at price ¯ P. Using equation (6) to solve for
the equilibrium quantity under a price ceiling, q∗
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The monopoly’s proﬁts are
π∗
ceil = q∗




We compute individual utilities and social welfare using the previously derived equations eval-
uated at the ceiling price level ¯ P. New cut-oﬀ ρ values, respectively denoted ρ∗
ceil and ρ∗
mceil for
nonmonopolists and monopolists, diﬀer from those obtained under unrestricted monopoly. For
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Similarly, equations (1), (2) and (3) allow us to write nonmonopolist h’s utility:
uh(d1h( ¯ P),d 2h( ¯ P)) =

[ρh(a2l + ¯ Pσ)/ ¯ P]ρh[(1 − ρh)(a2l + ¯ Pσ)](1−ρh) for ρh >ρ ∗
ceil
σρh(a2l)(1−ρh) for ρh ≤ ρ∗
ceil.
We again calculate social welfare by integrating over all individuals in the economy. First, for the
nonmonopolists,











¯ P−ρρρ(1 − ρ)(1−ρ)dρ. (14)
21See Burton, et al. (2001) for a discussion of the ethics of managing pharmaceutical beneﬁts.
22Our model does not consider utilization restrictions, as, for example, in prior-authorization programs. See Cook
(1999) for a thorough discussion of various cost-containment measures.
14The monopolists will purchase good one only if ρm >ρ ∗
mceil where ρ∗
mceil is as deﬁned in equation
(10) with π∗ = π∗
ceil. Individual monopolist utilities are derived as in the previous section, though
with π∗ = π∗
ceil. Aggregate monopolist welfare is


























Social welfare with a price ceiling set at ¯ P is the sum of equations (14) and (15), i.e., WCeil =
WCeil1 + WCeil2.
4. Universal Prescription Drug Insurance
Universal prescription drug insurance is an alternative approach to coping with the high and rising
cost of drugs. In fact, the 2003 Medicare Reform Act takes us signiﬁcantly “down the path” of
universal prescription drug coverage. Between the people covered by Medicare and those covered
by Medicaid, the public sector is responsible for drug beneﬁts for a large sector of the population.
Drug insurance permits sharing of the cost burden, so those experiencing the greatest need for
a drug will not be forced to bear the cost alone. We model a system in which everyone’s drug
purchases are subsidized with revenue raised by an income tax imposed on all individuals. In
spite of the fact that our model is simple relative to Medicaid programs or the new Medicare drug
beneﬁt program, it eﬀectively reﬂects features such as coinsurance and protection for high-drug-use
individuals. However, we do not include features such as beneﬁt caps, deductibles, premiums and
income-based eligibility requirements. We assume all individuals must participate in this program
and that the labor income of all individuals is taxed at the same proportional rate in order to
ﬁnance the program.
Purchases of the pharmaceutical are subsidized at rate δ per unit, leaving a coinsurance payment
of (1−δ) per unit required to purchase good one. To ﬁnance the program, each individual is required
to pay a portion t of his or her labor income in taxes. No capital income tax is imposed on the
proﬁts earned by monopolists.
The government is assumed to run a balanced budget with regard to this program. That is,
a2lt = δPUIqUI, (16)
15where qUI is the total amount of good one purchased by nonmonopolists and PUI is the price
charged by the monopoly under universal insurance.
The budget constraint for nonmonopolist h becomes
PUI(1 − δ)c1h + c2h ≤ a2l(1 − t). (17)
That is, the value of expenditures on consumption of good two and the unsubsidized portion of
good one cannot exceed after-tax income. Maximizing an individual’s utility (1) subject to (17) we
determine individual nonmonopolist demands for good one and good two. Then integrating over






a2l(1 − t)+PUIσ(1 − δ)
. (18)













We next follow the same process as that used for the unrestricted monopoly model:
• Compute total revenue, TR:






UI +2 qUIσ − qUI]. (20)
• Determine MR= ∂TR
∂qUI,s e tMR= MC (= a2
a1), and solve for q∗
UI, the equilibrium amount of












a1l(1−t). Substitute (21) into (19) to determine the equilibrium market price, P∗
UI.
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UI






a2l(1 − t)+σPUI(1 − δ)
and PNM = PUI(1 − δ) is the eﬀective price paid by nonmonopolists.
Welfare for the nonmonopolists is found by integrating the utilities of the nonmonopolists:












[PUI(1 − δ)]−ρρρ(1 − ρ)(1−ρ)dρ. (22)
The budget constraint facing monopolist m is
a2
a1





Maximizing an individual monopolist’s utility subject to (23) gives the monopolist’s optimal
consumption amounts. Utility at these optimal consumption amounts is integrated over all monop-
olists. Total monopolist welfare is as follows:


































a2σ + a1a2l(1 − t)+a1(π∗
UI/c)
. (25)
Social welfare under universal insurance will be the sum of equations (22) and (24), i.e., WUI =
WUI1 + WUI2.
In equilibrium, we can use the fact that the government must run a balanced budget to rewrite





This allows us to eliminate t from the above equations and to express the results solely in terms of
δ. To demonstrate the validity of this approach we present the following lemma.
Lemma 1: There exists a unique proportional tax rate t that balances the federal budget for each
subsidy rate δ. See the Appendix for a proof.
175. Welfare and Distributional Analysis
In this section we compute equilibria for the unrestricted monopoly, monopoly subject to a price
ceiling and universal drug coverage; we compare the equilibria. The diﬃculty in obtaining a closed-
form solution to several of the social welfare integrals makes analytical comparisons intractable; we
conduct a numerical analysis instead.23
We recognize that diﬀerent pharmaceutical products are consumed at diﬀerent rates in the
population and therefore examine two cases in detail. The ﬁrst presumes the pharmaceutical
is consumed by a relatively small portion of the population (e.g., 10 percent) when sold by an
unrestricted monopolist. The second presumes the pharmaceutical is consumed by a much larger
portion of the population (50 percent). (The utilization rate, as explained below, is directly related
to the model’s parameter σ.) Results for the two cases are qualitatively similar.
It is important to note that our objective cannot be to ﬁnd a policy that is Pareto superior to an
unregulated monopoly. This is because any policy that seeks to reduce the burden of pharmaceutical
expenditures on purchasers necessarily shifts some of those expenses to other individuals without
giving them any compensating beneﬁt (other than perhaps the warm glow that comes from knowing
other people’s pharmaceutical expenses are not too onerous). Thus the best we can hope for is to
improve overall social welfare.
Because the monopolists in our model obtain good one at cost in all three policy regimes
(unrestricted monopoly, price ceiling, and universal insurance), our welfare-gain estimates are con-
servative. Under both policy classes, nonmonopolist buyers of good one experience welfare gains
because of the decreased price of purchasing good one. Monopolists experience an income eﬀect
when their proﬁts change but, because of the assumption that they can buy good one at cost, do
not experience a welfare gain due to a change in the price of good one. The welfare gains reported
in the following sections would be larger (and losses smaller) were we to relax this assumption.
23To ensure our results are robust to various parameter combinations, we assess the comparative statics of the
model and conduct a comprehensive sensitivity study. Complete results are reported in Kelton and Rebelein (2005),
and are largely as expected. For example, the monopoly price, P
∗
M, decreases as good-one productivity, a1,i n c r e a s e s ,
while monopoly sales and proﬁts increase as a1 increases. All three quantities increase when the labor resource,
l, increases. The welfare measures are relatively insensitive to changes in parameter values in the range of values
employed for this study.
18Calibration
To determine reasonable parameter values for l, a1, a2 and c, we calibrate our model to observations
of the United States economy. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), there were 2,943.6
million hours worked per week in July 2003. The BLS reported total employment of 129,870,000
people that same month, resulting in an average of 22.67 hours worked per person per week.
Extrapolating over an entire year gives an average of l = 1182 hours worked per person per year.
Values for a1 and a2 are derived from United States Census Bureau manufacturing data. 1997
data for Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing (NAICS code 325412) indicate total employ-
ment of 115,781, with 62,741 production workers, and an average of 2020 hours worked per year
by the latter.24 Total value added by manufacture for the industry was $48,323.5 million in 1997,
giving an average value added per hour worked of $206.6 in that year. Adjusting for changes in the
producer price index gives a 2003 value of $273.1 for a1. Similarly, we use Census Bureau data for
All Manufacturing Establishments to determine a value for a2.25 Total employment of 16,805,127,
with production workers working an average of 2004 hours per year (24.18 billion hours divided
by 12.07 million production workers), generated manufacturing value added of $1,825,688 million.
Average value added per hour worked was $54.2 in 1997. Adjusting for changes in the producer
price index gives a 2003 value of $71.6 for a2. Our calibrated a2/a1 ratio is 0.262. It seems as
though “productivity” in pharmaceutical manufacturing, according to these simple statistics, is
approximately four times as high as that in manufacturing as a whole.
To estimate the fraction of the population sharing the monopoly license (c), we ﬁnd the portion
of total market capitalization accounted for by the pharmaceutical industry. Rather than add up
market capitalization for all pharmaceutical-producing ﬁrms, we determine market capitalization
for ﬁve of the largest ﬁrms (Merck, Bristol Myers Squibb, Pﬁzer, Abbott and Eli Lilly) and divide
by their market share of the pharmaceutical market (roughly 30 percent in 2002).26 Dividing the
result by total market capitalization for all ﬁrms (roughly $15 trillion in 2003 according to the New
York Stock Exchange website) gives a pharmaceutical industry share of approximately 13 percent.
The ﬁnal parameter, σ, indicating the beneﬁt obtained from the pharmaceutical, is chosen to
reﬂect particular consumption levels by the population. We examine two distinct cases: a high
24See the U.S. Census Bureau (1999), Table 2, “Industry Statistics for Selected States.”
25See the U.S. Census Bureau (2001), Table 1-1a, “Statistics for All Manufacturing Establishments: 1997 and
Earlier Years.”
26See Gale (2005), which retrieved data from the Encyclopedia of American Industries.
19value of σ corresponds to a low beneﬁt across the population and to relatively low consumption; a
low value of σ corresponds to a higher beneﬁt across the population and to higher consumption. We
choose the ﬁrst value of σ in order to produce a cut-oﬀ value for nonmonopolists of ρ∗(P∗
M)=0 .90
under the unrestricted monopoly. In other words, only individuals with ρh higher than 0.90 (10
percent of the population) consume some of the pharmaceutical under the unrestricted monopoly.
A second value of σ is chosen to produce a cut-oﬀ value for nonmonopolists of ρ∗(P∗
M)=0 .50.
This implies a 50 percent utilization rate for the pharmaceutical under the unrestricted monopoly.
Table I summarizes these calibration values.
In Table II we show equilibrium price and sales under unrestricted monopoly using the calibrated
parameter values from Table I. The equilibrium monopoly price, P∗
M, is 0.55 (measured in units of
good two per unit of good one) in the case of high σ, twice marginal cost (a2/a1 =0 .26), and 0.79,
three times marginal cost, in the case of low σ. Monopoly sales are 7,673 with high σ and 26,904
with low σ.
Social Welfare Eﬀects of a Price Ceiling
Using the calibrated parameter values from Table I we illustrate the welfare eﬀects of a price ceiling.
We vary the price ceiling level over an interval bounded by the monopoly price at the high end
and the competitive price (marginal cost) at the low end. Table III presents the results for a
pharmaceutical with a 10-percent utilization rate (high σ). Table IV presents the results for a
pharmaceutical with a 50-percent utilization rate (low σ). We see in Table III that social welfare
rises the more restrictive the price ceiling. More speciﬁcally, the increase in nonmonopolists’ welfare
exceeds the decline in monopolists’ welfare. The results shown in Table IV are qualitatively similar.
In each case social welfare rises as the level of the price ceiling falls, that is, as it approaches the
competitive price.27
The last column of these two tables gives the average percentage by which income under the
unregulated monopoly would need to increase in order to give all individuals the same utility as
they receive with the price ceiling. Again, the data suggest the cost to monopolists of the price
ceiling is less than the beneﬁt received by nonmonopolists. In addition, this diﬀerence increases as
the price ceiling is set lower and lower.
27This result may not occur for all industries. For some parameter conﬁgurations tested total welfare peaks not at
the competitive price level, but at approximately one third of the way from the competitive to the monopoly price.
20Table I: Calibrated Parameter Values
l a1 a2 c σ (High) σ (Low)
1182 273.1 71.6 0.13 1,370,000 107,500
Table II: Benchmark Equilibria
High σ Low σ
(10% Utilization) (50% Utilization)
Monopoly Price 0.55 0.79
Monopoly Sales 7,673 26,904
ρ∗ 0.90 0.50
Table III: Price Ceiling Example 1 (10 % Utilization)
¯ P (units Nonmonopolist Monopolist Equivalent
of good 2) q∗
ceil Welfare Welfare Total Welfare Variation
0.554 7,673 452,758 15,750 468,508 0.0%
0.524 8,502 453,110 15,743 468,853 0.28%
0.495 9,473 453,519 15,719 469,238 0.59%
0.466 10,621 453,997 15,673 469,670 0.95%
0.437 11,991 454,565 15,595 470,160 1.35%
0.408 13,645 455,247 15,475 470,722 1.82%
0.379 15,667 456,078 15,295 471,373 2.35%
0.350 18,176 457,107 15,031 472,139 2.98%
0.320 21,341 458,405 14,647 473,052 3.72%
0.291 25,413 460,073 14,086 474,159 4.61%
0.262 30,778 462,269 13,257 475,526 5.68%
21Table IV: Price Ceiling Example 2 (50 % Utilization)
¯ P (units Nonmonopolist Monopolist Equivalent
of good 2) q∗
ceil Welfare Welfare Total Welfare Variation
0.787 26,904 96,848 24,178 121,026 0.0%
0.734 29,819 98,123 24,147 122,270 1.79%
0.682 33,260 99,619 24,039 123,658 3.86%
0.629 37,366 101,393 23,827 125,220 6.28%
0.577 42,331 103,525 23,469 126,994 9.13%
0.524 48,427 106,122 22,907 129,029 12.55%
0.472 56,050 109,339 22,055 131,394 16.72%
0.420 65,799 113,407 20,778 134,185 21.90%
0.367 78,618 118,681 18,855 137,536 28.49%
0.315 96,091 125,743 15,899 141,642 37.14%
0.262 121,080 135,618 11,175 146,793 48.99%
22Distributional Eﬀects of a Price Ceiling
Figure 1 illustrates how individuals fare under a price ceiling on a drug with a 10-percent
utilization rate. The price ceiling is set such that the markup over cost (P∗
M − a2/a1 in our
model) is reduced by 50 percent from its level under unregulated monopoly. Utility diﬀerences
and equivalent income variations are measured relative to the benchmark of unregulated monopoly.
Most people are unaﬀected by the price ceiling since they do not consume the drug. The monopoly
shareholders are worse oﬀ (suﬀering approximately a two-percent decrease in utility), while the
drug consumers experience up to a four percent utility increase. Using equivalent variation, we see
that high-ρ consumers can experience an eﬀective increase in income of up to 35 percent when this
price ceiling is in place.
Table V provides additional detail by dividing individuals into four groups. Monopolists are
shareholders in the monopoly. “Non-Buyers” are nonmonopolists who choose not to purchase the
pharmaceutical under either the unregulated monopoly or under the price-ceiling regime. “New
Buyers” are nonmonopolists who choose not to purchase the pharmaceutical under the unregulated
monopoly, but do purchase some when the price ceiling is imposed. “Always Buyers” are nonmo-
nopolists who purchase the pharmaceutical under both regimes. The “Total” for each column is
the average of the diﬀerent equivalent variation values weighted by the fraction of the population
in each group.
For a drug utilized by 50 percent of the population, monopolists experience the equivalent of
a 1.0 percent income decrease when their markup is reduced 25 percent. They experience the
equivalent of a 5.6 percent income decrease when their markup is reduced 50 percent. When the
drug is used by a smaller proportion of the population (10 percent), the welfare losses are smaller.
In each of the four scenarios in Table V, New Buyers and Always Buyers beneﬁt from the price
ceiling. Indeed, Always Buyers experience over a 20 percent eﬀective increase in income when the
markup is reduced 50 percent by the price ceiling.
It is interesting to note that the Total welfare improvement is larger the more restrictive is the
price ceiling. Obviously a price ceiling could not be set so low as to prevent a ﬁrm from being able
to recoup its R & D costs. However, for pharmaceuticals utilized by a relatively small protion of
the population, it appears likely a price ceiling could provide substantial beneﬁts to pharmaceutical
users at only a modest cost to producers.































Figure 1: Comparison of Individual Utility Under Price Ceiling Versus
Unrestricted Monopoly (50 % Markup Reduction and 10 % Utilization
Rate)
Table V: Equivalent Variations for Price Ceiling Example
Percent Income under Monopoly must Increase
in order to achieve utility under Price Ceiling
50% Utilization 10% Utilization
Group 25% Reductiona 50% Reduction 25% Reduction 50% Reduction
Monopolists −1.0% −5.6% −0.3% −1.9%
Non-Buyers 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
New Buyers 0.3% 1.3% 0.3% 1.4%
Always Buyers 10.3% 26.3% 8.0% 20.1%
Total 5.0% 12.6% 0.8% 1.8%
aThe monopoly charges a price above the marginal cost of production (a2/a1). A 25% reduction indicates the
price ceiling is set to eliminate 25 percent of this markup.
24The Food and Drug Administration uses the term “orphan drug” to refer to a pharmaceutical
that treats a rare disease, aﬀecting fewer than 200,000 Americans. Pharmaceutical companies,
concerned they will not be able to recoup their costs, generally choose not to undertake research
and development of such drugs. The Orphan Drug Act, passed in 1983, encourages orphan drug
development through tax incentives, grant funding and the granting of marketing exclusivity after
product approval. If we set σ in our model to correspond to an orphan drug utilization rate of
0.1 percent and set the price ceiling to reduce 50 percent of the markup over cost we obtain the
following results: the Always Buyers group experiences a welfare improvement equivalent to an
income increase of 18.9 percent; the New Buyers experience a welfare improvement equivalent to
an income increase of 1.6 percent; and the Monopolists experience a welfare decline equivalent to
an income decrease of 0.01 percent. Non-Buyers are unaﬀected.
Social Welfare Eﬀects of Universal Insurance
We next use the calibrated parameter values to determine the welfare eﬀects of a simple universal
prescription-drug insurance program. Table VI presents our results for the 10-percent utilization
case (high σ). (Figure 2 presents some of these results graphically.) The ﬁrst row of Table VI,
with no subsidy or tax, corresponds to the unrestricted-monopoly benchmark from Table II. The
ﬁrst column of Table VI indicates the speciﬁc subsidy rate as a percentage of the pharmaceutical’s
market price. The second column indicates the proportional income tax rate required to balance
the government’s budget. For example, a 20 percent pharmaceutical subsidy could be ﬁnanced with
an income tax of 1.5 percent. The market price for a 20-percent subsidy rate is 0.560, compared
to 0.554 for the benchmark. Monopoly sales are 11,132, higher than the benchmark sales of 7,673.
Nonmonopolist welfare is lower than benchmark welfare because most nonmonopolists pay the tax
and do not consume the pharmaceutical. Monopolist welfare increases relative to the benchmark,
because of the larger proﬁts they receive, and total welfare increases slightly. The ﬁnal column shows
that introducing a universal insurance program with a 20 percent subsidy would be equivalent to
increasing all individuals’ incomes by an average of 0.86 percent.28
Table VI and Figure 2 show that monopolist welfare increases as the subsidy rate, δ,a n dt h e
corresponding tax rate, t, increase. Indeed, monopolist welfare should increase since the subsidy
increases monopoly sales and proﬁts. Nonmonopolist welfare, on the other hand, decreases as the
28By way of comparison, Moon and Storeygard (2002) also estimates the cost of various subsidy rates and concludes
that a 23 percent subsidy rate would be appropriate to provide reasonable Medicare reform. This corresponds to a
2.0 percent income tax in Table VI. The 2003 Medicare Reform Act subsidizes most pharmaceutical expenditures at
a 75-percent rate but includes various beneﬁt caps and deductibles.
25Table VI: Universal Insurance Example 1 (10 % Utilization)
Subsidy Tax PUI (units Nonmonopolist Monopolist Total Equiv.
Rate Rate of good 2) qUI Welfare Welfare Welfare Variation
0% 0.0 % 0.554 7,673 452,758 15,750 468,508 0.0%
10 % 0.6 % 0.557 9,171 452,647 16,189 468,835 0.41%
20 % 1.5 % 0.560 11,132 452,386 16,763 469,149 0.86%
30 % 2.8 % 0.564 13,755 451,874 17,533 469,407 1.38%
40 % 4.7 % 0.570 17,353 450,933 18,594 469,527 2.00%
50 % 7.6 % 0.576 22,422 449,221 20,104 469,326 2.66%
60 % 12.4 % 0.585 29,781 446,044 22,331 468,375 3.14%
70 % 20.1 % 0.597 40,800 439,865 25,744 465,609 3.28%
80 % 33.5 % 0.612 57,787 426,852 31,188 458,039 1.92%
90 % 57.0 % 0.634 84,589 395,069 40,207 435,276 −4.84%































Figure 2: Welfare under Universal Insurance (10 % Utilization Rate)
26subsidy rate increases. The subsidy encourages more individuals to purchase the pharmaceutical,
but the majority still choose not to do so. The beneﬁt of being able to purchase subsidized
pharmaceuticals is clearly outweighed by the consequence of being taxed to pay for the subsidy. For
subsidy rates below 40 percent, total welfare increases as the subsidy rate increases. Nonmonopolist
welfare decreases less than monopolist welfare rises for subsidies in this range. At subsidy rates up
to 50 percent, total welfare exceeds that of the unregulated monopoly. Note that the equivalent
variation is positive up to a subsidy rate of 80 percent. Both the total welfare and equivalent
variation measures show that the universal insurance program can improve social welfare beyond
that obtained in the benchmark case.
Table VII and Figure 3 present results for a pharmaceutical with a 50-percent utilization rate
(low σ). The results are qualitatively identical to those obtained in the high-σ case. While monop-
olist welfare increases consistently with an increase in the drug subsidy rate, nonmonopolist welfare
falls.29 Total welfare exceeds benchmark welfare at all subsidy rates. At subsidy rates up to 50
percent, the equivalent variation measure shows an increase in welfare relative to the benchmark.
Figure 4 illustrates the diﬀerence in equivalent variation values for diﬀerent pharmaceutical uti-
lization rates. The data here suggest greater welfare gains are available the less the pharmaceutical
is consumed across the population. In addition, we see the welfare-maximizing subsidy rate can
be diﬀerent for pharmaceuticals with diﬀerent utilization rates. A subsidy rate of 60–70 percent
may maximize welfare for a product consumed by a relatively small portion of the population, but
this rate could actually cause a welfare decline if applied to a pharmaceutical consumed by a large
portion of the population. This suggests it may be necessary to classify pharmaceuticals as to the
prevalence of their use before implementing this kind of universal insurance program.
A lingering concern about our welfare results may be the assumption that monopoly owners can
purchase good one at cost. This concern arises since the lower price is one source of the higher utility
received by monopolists. To investigate this concern, we repeat the preceding analysis assuming
the monopoly owners face the (subsidized) market price for good one. There were no diﬀerences
from the original results in the 10-percent utilization case – the low utilization rate means that,
even at very high subsidy rates, monopoly owners will not choose to purchase good one.
29There is an increase in nonmonopolist welfare as the subsidy rate rises from zero to 5 percent, but, at subsidy
rates above 5 percent, welfare declines.
27Table VII: Universal Insurance Example 2 (50 % Utilization)
Subsidy Tax PUI (units Nonmonopolist Monopolist Total Equiv.
Rate Rate of good 2) qUI Welfare Welfare Welfare Variation
0% 0% 0.787 26,904 96,848 24,178 121,026 0.0%
10 % 2.8 % 0.802 29,318 96,871 25,445 122,317 0.48%
20 % 6.2 % 0.820 32,060 96,761 26,925 123,686 0.86%
30 % 10.5 % 0.839 35,189 96,453 28,668 125,121 1.03%
40 % 15.8 % 0.861 38,782 95,850 30,740 126,591 0.92%
50 % 22.5 % 0.886 42,934 94,797 33,233 128,030 0.32%
60 % 31.0 % 0.914 47,769 93,036 36,269 129,305 −1.05%
70 % 41.9 % 0.947 53,448 90,102 40,018 130,120 −3.71%
80 % 56.0 % 0.985 60,183 85,045 44,725 129,771 −8.70%
90 % 74.8 % 1.030 68,263 75,353 50,748 126,101 −18.6%



























Figure 3: Welfare under Universal Insurance (50 % Utilization Rate)



















































Figure 4: Equivalent Variations at Diﬀerent Drug Utilization Rates
29In the second case (50 percent utilization), monopoly owners purchase some of good one at
subsidy rates in excess of 60 percent. Hence our welfare results diﬀer at these high subsidy rates
from those in Table VII. Table VIII presents the aggregate equivalent variation values assuming
monopolists must pay the market price, P∗
M, under unregulated monopoly and pay the subsidized
price, P∗
UI(1 − δ), under universal insurance. For comparison purposes, the original equivalent
variation values are repeated. The diﬀerences between the initial equivalent variation values and
the new equivalent variation values are small and all values have the same signs.30 Therefore, we
conclude that the assumption that monopolists may buy good one at cost has little eﬀect on the
results of our analysis.
Distributional Eﬀects of Universal Insurance
We next look more closely at the distributional eﬀects of the universal insurance regime. We choose a
speciﬁc subsidy level (δ =50%) and speciﬁc utilization rate of 10 percent and compute two measures
of the beneﬁts (or consequences) accruing to diﬀerent individuals.31 We ﬁrst compare the utility
individual h receives under the universal insurance regime with the utility he or she receives under
the unrestricted monopoly regime. We ﬁnd that two groups of individuals – monopolists and high-
drug-need nonmonopolists – have higher utility under universal insurance. Other nonmonopolists
do better under the unrestricted monopoly regime. The percentage diﬀerence in utility obtained
by diﬀerent individuals is shown graphically by the dashed line in Figure 5.
Using the equivalent variation approach we again ﬁnd that monopolists beneﬁt under universal
insurance, as do the nonmonopolists who actually consume the pharmaceutical, while the majority
of nonmonopolists are better oﬀ under unrestricted monopoly. For monopolists, changing to a
universal insurance regime is similar to giving them a 30 percent increase in income (see the solid
line in Figure 5). For the individuals with the greatest need for the pharmaceutical, changing to
a universal insurance regime is similar to giving them a 50 to 75 percent increase in income. For
nonmonopolists who do not consume the pharmaceutical, changing to a universal insurance regime
is equivalent to taking away approximately seven percent of their income.
Table IX, like Table V above, provides additional detail for four groups. The eﬀects are as
expected: the higher the subsidy rate the better oﬀ are members of the Monopolists and Always
30As discussed earlier, the computed welfare losses are larger when monopolists are allowed to acquire good one at
cost, supporting the idea that our welfare estimates in Tables III – VII are conservative.
31Other δ selections give results similar to those described below.
30Table VIII: Universal Insurance at High Subsidy
Rates when Monopolists Pay Market Price for




60 % −1.05 % −1.05 %
70 % −3.71 % −3.68 %
80 % −8.70 % −8.46 %
90 % −18.6% −17.4%































Figure 5: Comparison of Individual Utility Under Universal Insurance
Versus Unrestricted Monopoly (50 % Subsidy Rate and 10 % Utilization
Rate)
31Buyers groups, while members of the other groups are made worse oﬀ because of the higher tax rate
required. Also expected are the smaller gains for the Monopolists, and losses for the Non-Buyers
and New Buyers, at the lower utilization rate. Surprising, however, is the greater beneﬁt received
by the Always Buyers group at the lower utilization rate. This is also reﬂected in the higher totals
(shown in the last row of Table IX) for the lower utilization rate. These data suggest a universal
insurance program for pharmaceutical products that ﬁrst targets pharmaceuticals consumed by
relatively small portions of the population would produce the greatest social welfare gain, while
imposing the smallest burden on non-pharmaceutical consumers.
As was observed for a price ceiling, substantial welfare gains are possible for drugs with very
low utilization rates with only a modest welfare cost. If we set σ in our model to correspond to
an “orphan” drug utilization rate of 0.1 percent and set the subsidy rate at 50 percent we obtain
the following results: the Always Buyers group experiences a welfare improvement equivalent to an
income increase of 65 percent; the New Buyers experience a welfare improvement equivalent to an
income increase of 7.4 percent; and the Monopolists experience a welfare improvement equivalent
to an income increase of 0.5 percent. Only the Non-Buyers lose, with a welfare decline equivalent
to an income decrease of 0.1 percent. This result is consistent with the trend (observed above)
that subsidizing less-utilized drugs produces larger social welfare gains overall with fewer adverse
distributional eﬀects.
Political Economy Implications
A 2005 Standard and Poors report concludes that many pharmaceutical manufacturers earn
proﬁts in excess of 20 percent of their costs.32 Earlier (fn. 9) we indicated that some individual
pharmaceutical products recorded sales in excess of $2 billion in 2004 alone, suggesting proﬁts
approaching $400 million annually for a single patented pharmaceutical product. We are not
suggesting all pharmaceutical products generate this much proﬁt; however, there is almost certainly
room for price reductions without choking oﬀ R & D. For example, a ﬁrm earning proﬁts of $200
million per year will recoup its R & D costs in only four years (on average) with at least six years
of eﬀective patent coverage yet to come. Reducing pharmaceutical markups by 50 percent would
still allow such a ﬁrm to recoup its R & D costs within the period of patent protection and also
generate proﬁts for its shareholders.
32See Standard and Poors, Industry Survey, July 21, 2005.
32Table IX: Equivalent Variations Under Universal Insurance
Percent Income under Monopoly must Increase
in order to achieve utility under Universal Insurance
50% Utilization 10% Utilization
Group 25% Subsidy 50% Subsidy 25% Subsidy 50% Subsidy
Monopolists 16.0% 40.5% 9.4% 29.9%
Non-Buyers −8.2% −22.5% −2.1% −7.6%
New Buyers −8.1% −21.8% −1.1% −2.9%
Always Buyers 3.9% 6.7% 14.8% 43.0%
Total 1.0% 0.3% 1.1% 2.6%
33With respect to universal insurance, Figure 5 above illustrates the problem of implementing a
universal insurance scheme through majority-rule voting. Roughly 25 percent of the individuals
have positive equivalent variation values under the insurance plan, while the rest are worse oﬀ
and would, as rational voters, not support the plan. As such, a simple one-person, one-vote,
majority-rule voting system would reject such a program. In practice, however, not everybody votes.
Elderly individuals are more likely to vote and more likely to be pharmaceitucal consumers. In
contrast, young individuals are less likely to vote and less likely to be pharmaceutical consumers.33
Conceivably a coalition of monopoly owners and elderly drug consumers could generate suﬃcient
votes to overcome the apathy of the nonconsumers and pass a drug subsidy program. In fact,
because the beneﬁts accruing to monopoly owners and high drug users continue to increase as the
subsidy rate increases, a coalition of these two groups may vote for a plan with a subsidy rate that
is too high to be welfare-improving for the economy as a whole. Risk aversion may elicit additional
support for a universal insurance program were everyone to have some small probability of needing
a very expensive medication.34
Short of a successful popular vote, it would fall to the government to implement a social-welfare-
enhancing price ceiling or universal insurance program for prescription drugs. Our results clearly
suggest the government is correct to do this in the case of orphan drugs.
6. Conclusion
For the last decade, both the public and private sectors of the economy have been forced to respond
to the high and rising cost of pharmaceuticals. Responses such as cost-containing formularies or
insurance plans, that shift some of the cost burden away from high-need consumers, are arising
rapidly. Practical, individualized solutions developed by hospitals, pharmacies, or third-party pay-
ers are emerging in a state of urgency. Our paper steps back from the immediacy of the problem in
order to develop a framework for making comparisons of social-welfare implications across policy
regimes.
33The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 65.1 percent of individuals aged 65 to 74 voted in the 2002 elections
while only 31.8 percent of individuals aged 25 to 34 turned out to vote. See Day and Holder (2004).
34Bednarek and Pecchenino (2002) oﬀer an example of explicit modeling of uncertainty regarding the severity of
an illness. In their overlapping generations model, an individual has diﬀerent probabilities of contracting an illness
of minor or major severity in their second (ﬁnal) period of life.
34Since partial-equilibrium models ignore the interactions between the drug market and markets
for other goods, we work with a general-equilibrium monopoly model in order to gain a complete
picture of the eﬀects these policies may have. Our model clearly shows the interaction between
the pharmaceutical market and the rest of the economy. Further, it accounts for both consumer
and shareholder well-being by explicitly modeling the preferences of both groups. In the con-
text of our general-equilibrium framework, we compare social welfare occurring under the current,
patented-monopoly, system to that for two possible alternative policy regimes: a price ceiling on
the monopolistically produced good and a simple form of universal insurance. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant
potential for improvement under both policy regimes.
The pattern of gains resulting under a price ceiling is as expected: the lower the ceiling the
greater the welfare redistribution from monopolists to nonmonopolist drug consumers. While the
welfare gains experienced by drug consumers are substantial, the welfare losses incurred by monop-
olists are modest, leading to an overall welfare increase. The pattern of welfare gains and losses is
also as expected with universal insurance: monopolists and drug consumers gain while non-drug
consumers foot the bill. For lower subsidy (and tax) rates, gains to monopolists and high-need drug
consumers exceed the welfare losses to other nonmonopolists, leading to an overall increase in so-
cial welfare. Both the price ceiling and universal insurance programs oﬀer clear gains for high-need
pharmaceutical consumers. The primary diﬀerence between the two programs is the eﬀect each has
on the welfare of monopolists.
Under both policy regimes, the welfare gains for drug consumers are particularly substantial
relative to the losses incurred by others when the drug is consumed by only a small portion of the
population. This result suggests these policies could be especially helpful in ensuring accessibility
to so called “orphan” drugs. In particular, we ﬁnd that subsidizing orphan drugs even at very high
subsidy rates is welfare-improving, with little consequence for monopolists.
While the general-equilibrium model is able to mimic several features of real-world pharma-
ceutical markets and cost-containment and insurance proposals, future research should incorporate
even more realism. Phenomena we would like to add include explicit modeling of the R & D pro-
cess in the branded pharmaceutical sector; heterogeneity in the income proﬁles of individuals in the
economy; the eﬀects of pharmaceutical companies’ advertising; individual uncertainty regarding a
consumer’s need for the pharmaceutical; and a market for a generic pharmaceutical product.
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38Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof proceeds in two parts. We ﬁrst show there exists at most one t for each δ that will
balance the federal budget. We then show there exists at least one t for each δ.
1. To show there exists at most one t for a given δ, we show that government revenues are
strictly increasing in t, while the cost of the subsidy is strictly decreasing in t.T h u s ,t h e r e
exists at most one intersection of the government’s revenue and cost curves for each subsidy
rate δ.
Since labor is inelastically supplied by all individuals, increases in t will not cause any reduc-
tion in labor eﬀort, and tax revenues will be strictly increasing as t increases.
To show total cost is strictly decreasing, we begin with equation (21) and diﬀerentiate qUI
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Since all parameter values are positive, and t and δ are less than one, ∂x
∂t is positive, and,
therefore, qUI is strictly decreasing in t.
Next we diﬀerentiate the total subsidy cost δPUIqUI,w h e r ePUIqUI is given by equation (20),












































39The leading term is positive, as is (1−t), and we showed above that
∂qUI
∂t < 0. The last term,
(qUI − (q2
UI +2 qUIσ)1/2), is clearly negative, so if
(q2
UI +2 qUIσ)−1/2(qUI + σ) − 1 > 0,
we will have our desired result. We rewrite the left-hand side as
qUI + σ

(qUI + σ)2 − σ2 − 1
which is clearly greater than 0.
2. To show there exists at least one t for each δ ∈ (0,1) we consider the values of the revenue
and subsidy that result at the extremes of t =0 .0a n dt =1 .0. Assume δ is ﬁxed. When t =0
the government raises no revenue; when t = 1 the government collects a2l. The subsidy cost
when t = 1 will be zero since nonmonopolists have no disposable income. The subsidy cost
when t = 0 is necessarily positive. This is because we assume the nonmonopolists purchase
a positive amount of good one when the monopoly is unregulated (i.e., when δ = 0). With
δ>0 the price facing nonmonopolists declines so they purchase at least as much as they do
when δ = 0. Finally, since government revenue rises from zero on the interval t ∈ [0,1] and
subsidy cost declines to zero on this interval, it must be that they intersect at some value of
t ∈ (0,1).
Q.E.D.
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